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Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of changes in the winning chances of
candidates running for the 2007 French presidential election on abnormal
stock returns of firms that could benefit from a candidate’s victory. We use
prices formed by transactions on a political prediction market to reveal the
probabilities of victory of S. Royal and N. Sarkozy. We find that changes in
S. Royal’s probability of victory have no impact on firms that should benefit
from her party platform. On the opposite, abnormal returns of firms that
should benefit from reforms announced by N. Sarkozy or that are directed or
owned by his friends are positively correlated with changes in his probability
of victory. Both effects appear to be independent and the network effect is
fifty percents larger than the other one. All these results persist when we
take into account specific characteristics of firms.
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1 Introduction
Political majorities have an impact on global economic activity. This effect is
driven by ideology or by the nature of the competition to access the power (see
Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) and Alesina et al. (1997) for seminal surveys of
this issue). At a micro-level, political majorities can impact the value of firms,
either through their political orientations or friendship connections of individuals
in office. In this paper, we analyze returns of firms listed on the French stock
market induced by anticipated changes in the political majority during the 2007
French presidential election.
To achieve this, we compare the effect of changes in the different candidates’
probability of victory on the value of firms. We use prices from a prediction market
to assess changes in each candidate’s probability of victory. We correlate abnormal
returns of stocks of firms belonging to different groups to these changes. Firms that
should benefit of S. Royal’s platform do not exhibit high abnormal returns. On
the opposite, firms that should benefit from reforms announced by N. Sarkozy or
whose top executives or main shareholders are friends of him exhibit significantly
positive abnormal returns. The effect of the raise of N. Sarkozy on the latter group
is stronger than the effect on the first group.
All in all, results presented in this paper uncover the value attached to the
political platforms of candidates and to the friendship connections of N. Sarkozy.
Other papers show that friendship connections are priced by the market. Fisman
(2001) shows that Indonesian firms linked with Suharto have seen their value
decreasing with Suharto’s health problems. Do et al. (2011) show that US firms
whose top executives are connected to politicians running for the Congress exhibit
positive abnormal returns if the politician wins. Khwaja and Mian (2005) present
the advantage of politically connected firms to have access to the financial market
in Pakistan. Claessens et al. (2008) study political connections and preferential
access to finance. Fan et al. (2007) and Li et al. (2008) estimate the value of
political connections in China. Goldman et al. (2009) determines the impact of
politically connected boards on firms value in the United States.
Prediction markets offer an interesting source of data concerning political ex-
pectations as shown by Knight (2007) and Snowberg et al. (2007). They consist in
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betting markets where betters can exchange contracts whose payoffs depend on the
outcome of a contingent event. For the 2007 French presidential election, News-
Futures proposed “Winner-take-all” contracts linked to the victory of S. Royal or
N. Sarkozy. Under the market efficiency assumption, the literature interprets the
price of a “Winner-take-all” contract as the average probability of the candidate’s
victory as estimated by the market. This is the best prevision of future outcomes
on the basis of past and current public information. In that case, a change in prices
of such contracts reflects the arrival of unexpected and relevant news. Prediction
markets have often formulated accurate predictions about political outcomes. Us-
ing Iowa Electronic Market data about American presidential elections of 1988,
1992, 1996, and 2000, Berg et al. (2003) show that these data are more accurate
than opinion polls. Rhode and Strumpf (2004) point out that a large political
prediction market correctly anticipated the outcomes of the American presidential
elections from 1868 to 1940 while no scientific opinion poll was available. Studying
betting on district-level political elections in Australia, Wolfers and Leigh (2002)
find that market predictions are accurate in spite of the fact that no scientific
opinion poll is available for this type of elections. Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004)
reach similar conclusions. See also Snowberg et al. (2011) who highlight how pre-
diction market data help in event studies. By separating a single event window
into many small sub-windows, prediction markets data make estimates of relations
more precise than traditional event studies.
Using a panel data set made of the 119 largest firms listed on the French stock
market, we analyze the correlation between the time series of variations of the
probability of a candidate’s victory and abnormal stock market returns of these
firms from January 1st 2007 to the election day. Abnormal returns of a firm are
defined as the part of its returns that cannot be simply explained by the average
stock market evolution: they represent the idiosyncratic evolution of a firm value.
Under the assumption that stock market’s actors use all the available information
in the best possible way, abnormal returns of firms evolve before the election
as its outcome is anticipated. Firms that should benefit in one way or another
from the victory of a specific candidate should have abnormal returns positively
correlated with changes in this candidate’s probability of victory. Contrary to
Herron et al. (1999) who investigates impacts of political majority at the sector
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level, or Snowberg et al. (2007) who analyze these impacts on aggregate values
(stock markets index, oil price, bonds, future price of dollars etc.), we propose a
semi-disaggregated analysis to point out impacts of political majorities on specific
groups. This allows us to test two potential channels of transmission from politics
to the firms’ value: the announced reforms included in programs and the friendship
network channel. Accordingly, we create three different groups of firms on the basis
of available information. Two of them are made of firms that should benefit from
reforms announced by N. Sarkozy and S. Royal. The last one is made of firms
owned or directed by friends of N. Sarkozy whose connections with businessmen
as been largely discussed by French medias. We find that N. Sarkozy ’s winning
probability is positively associated with abnormal returns of firms listed in his
network or supposed to benefit from his political program. Both effects seem
independent. The effect on firms’ abnormal returns associated with membership
to his network is however around fifty percents larger than the other one. Isolating
from his network his close friends, we find that the effect is the strongest for firms
ruled or owned by his closest friends. There is also partial evidence that firms
listed in the network of N. Sarkozy have abnormal returns negatively correlated
with changes in the winning probability of S. Royal and abnormal returns of firms
that should benefit from S. Royal’s program are not correlated with changes in
her winning probability. All these results take into account that changes in the
candidates’ probability of victory may also impact firms differently depending on
their characteristics such as the industry in which they are active, their size or
whether they are partially owned by the state or not.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
Newsfutures data and the way the different groups are constructed. Section 3
describes and discusses the identification strategy based on the efficiency market
hypothesis. Empirical results are presented in section 4. Finally, section 5 provides
concluding remarks.
2 Data
This section presents the data used in this paper: the firms value data set and the
political expectations data set.
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Stock market returns and groups of firms
The SBF 120 is a reference index composed by the 120 most actively traded stocks
on the Paris stock Exchange. In this paper, we use daily stock values of firms
composing the SBF 120 from mid-2006 to mid-2007. Data are from Euronext.1
The daily return of each firm is simply the change in percentage between the
opening price and the closing price. We extract information about ownership of
each firm by the state from Ernst & Young (2007).
Before the election, experts from “La Société Générale”, a French leading bank,
had analyzed the electoral programs of N. Sarkozy and S. Royal and defined two
portfolios composed of 27 selected firms that could benefit from reforms announced
by each candidate. In this paper, we take these two groups as given by La Société
Générale (2007). The detailed composition of both groups is presented in appendix.
Medias have reported strong connections between N. Sarkozy and some busi-
nessmen. The term “valeurs Sarkozy” has been used sometimes in media to name
firms like Dassault, Lagardère, and Bouygues for example. We build a list of busi-
nessmen connected to N. Sarkozy using information provided by various sources
such as Chemin and Perrignon (2007) and Dély and Hassoux (2008). We associate
firms of the SBF 120 to people who direct the firm or own it. To assess ownership,
we check whether an individual holds over 5% of shares or of voting rights. We
take into account indirect participation. The precise description of firms we listed
in the network of N. Sarkozy is presented in appendix.
The full list of firms included in the different groups can be found in table 8
in appendix. The number of firms within each group is given by figure 1. Table 1
presents descriptive statistics for average returns of firms belonging to the different
groups from January 1st 2007 to the first round of the presidential election.
Prediction market data
The French presidential election follows a two-round process to elect by direct vote
a president for a five-year term. This election orientates the political majority
at the French parliament. For the 2007 presidential election, the first round of
1Only 119 firms are used in this paper. We exclude Eurotunnel from the analysis because its
quotation was stopped during part of the period.
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voting took place on April 22nd. The main political candidates were known by
the beginning of January 2007: F. Bayrou, S. Royal, and N. Sarkozy.2 Since
no candidate obtained a majority of fifty percents plus one vote, a second round
between the two leading candidates took place on May 6th. N. Sarkozy, leader of
the main right-wing party was opposed to S. Royal, candidate of the main left-wing
party. N. Sarkozy was elected.
We use data from a predictive market website – NewsFutures – to measure daily
changes in each candidate’s probability of victory between January 1st 2007 and
the first round of the election. NewsFutures was the prediction market with the
strongest activity for this election. On this website, players sell and buy “Winner-
take-all” contracts over a candidate’s name (S. Royal or N. Sarkozy) that offer a
100 units payoff if this candidate finally wins the election. The exchange price of
these contracts between player depends on instantaneous matching of demand and
supply. After receiving a free initial endowment, betters can set limit orders. N
contracts are issued (destroyed) when a better wants to buy (to sell) N contracts
and another better wants to buy (to sell) N opposite contracts. The historic of
prices, bid and ask orders, the number of contracts in circulation are common
knowledge among betters. Until the outcome is decided, the trading price reflects
to a certain extent the collective consensus among betters about the expected
value of the contract, i.e. the average probability of each candidate’s victory as
estimated by the market. For an interesting discussion over the interpretation of
prediction prices as probabilities, see Manski (2004) and Wolfers and Zitzewitz
(2006).
A transaction is registered at a given price as soon as two opposite orders match.
It was active 7 days a week and 24 hours a day, from the end of 2005 to May 6th
2007. We gathered the whole historic record of transactions of “Winner-take-all”
contracts associated with S. Royal and N. Sarkozy. We reconstruct opening and
closing prices to match the daily pattern of the French stock market.3 We then
2S. Royal was declared as the official candidate of her party after the primaries of the “Parti
Socialiste”, on November 16th 2006. F. Bayrou presented his will to run the election for the “Mo-
dem” on December 2nd 2006. Finally, although the primaries of the “Union pour un Mouvement
Populaire” occurred only in January 2007, it was already clear that N. Sarkozy would be the
candidate of this party.
3For each contract, we define the opening price as the price of the closest transaction to 9
a.m., and the closing price as the price of the closest transaction to 5 : 30 p.m. French legal time.
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define the daily change in percentage of each candidate’s probability to be elected
as the ratio of the difference between closing and opening prices to the opening
price.
Note that NewsFutures uses virtual currency as requested by French law. This
may raise an issue concerning the quality of the prediction made by players on the
election’s outcome. There are however some points that allow to alleviate some
of these doubts. For instance, the best betters are ranked on the website. The
ranking of top betters and the virtual wealth can be considered as a symbolical
payoff, and seem to be a sharp incentive to predict well, if we trust the enthusiasm
of betters on the website forum. In addition, gains in virtual money allow the
better to participate to auctions to win “real” goods, so payoffs are indirectly real.
See Servan-Schreiber et al. (2004) for additional comments on this issue.
Activity on NewsFutures has increased until the 2007 French presidential elec-
tion. As shown by figure 2, the number of transactions per day sharply increased
from December 2006. All days without any exchange occur before December 2006.
Even if days without any exchange or a weak activity do not necessarily mean
that the prediction market is inefficient (if no relevant information is revealed, no
change in prices should occur), information conveyed by such low flows of transac-
tions may be scarce. Note that activity sharply increases when the main candidate
became confirmed and publicly known. In this paper, we use only data from Jan-
uary 1st 2007 on.
Figure 3 plot the victory probabilities of N. Sarkozy and S. Royal as the price
of associated “Winner-take-all” contracts from December 2006 on. Assuming that
only three candidates could have won the elections from the point of view of in-
vestors and betters and that the market is balanced, we compute the probability
of victory of F. Bayrou as Max {0, 100− PRoyal − PSarkozy}, where PCandidate is the
price of “Winner-take-all” contract on Candidate. NewsFutures has correctly pre-
dicted the two winners of the first round (N. Sarkozy and S. Royal) and the final
winner of the election. We globally observe three periods. Up to February, con-
tracts associated with S. Royal and N. Sarokzy are exchanged at the same price
of 50 virtual curency units. From February on, the probability of victory of N.
Sarkozy steady increases. This went alongside with a regular decrease of the one
of S. Royal. In March, F. Bayrou appeared as an credible alternative during a
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short period of time.
3 Estimation strategy
This section briefly describes the estimation strategy to uncover and estimate the
market value of political orientations and friendship connections of the different
candidates who ran for the 2007 French presidential election. To achieve this, we
look at the correlation between winning probability changes of one candidate and
abnormal returns of firms listed on the French stock market.
We first construct abnormal returns of each firm by estimating the relation of
its return to the market return before the events period and predicting them over
the period of interest (see MacKinlay (1997)). Concretely, we run the following
regression for each firm i using daily returns between September 1st and December
31st 2006:
Rt = α + β × R¯t + εt, (1)
where Rt is firm i stock return on day t, R¯t is the market return on day t, and εt is
the error term.4 We estimate this expression separately for each firm, what gives
us distinct pairs of parameters αˆ and βˆ for each firm. These estimated parameters
are used to compute abnormal returns of each firm from January 1st 2007 to the
election date using the following formula:
R˜t = Rt −
{
αˆ + βˆ × R¯t
}
, (2)
where R˜t is abnormal return of firm i and the other notations are as defined above.
The method we use to identify correlations between changes of candidates’
winning probabilities and abnormal returns of firms consists mainly in the esti-
mation of interaction terms. The expression we estimate includes daily firm level
observations from January 1st to April 22nd 2007. It can be written as follows:
R˜it = α + β ×∆Candidatejt + γ × 1 {Groupc}i ×∆Candidatejt + Ii + εit, (3)
4In this paper, we use average daily return of stocks that are part of the SBF 120 as market
return. Results using the SBF 120 index, i.e. taking into account relative sizes of firms, to
compute the market return are fairly identical.
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where ∆Candidatejt is the change in percentage of candidate j winning probability
on day t, 1 {Groupc}i is equal to 1 if firm i belongs to group c, Ii is a firm fixed
effect, and εit is the error term. This flexible expression allows us to include
additional interaction terms with different terms and different candidates. We
estimate this expression using ordinary least squares and correct standard errors
to take heteroscedasticity into account. Parameter β captures the average effect
of changes in winning probability of candidate j on all firms abnormal returns.
Parameter γ captures the effect of changes in winning probability of candidate j
on firms that belong to group c.
Considering abnormal returns allows to directly look at the over or under-
performance of a group of firms according to a political scenario and to point
out redistribution effects among firms (as used by Knight (2007) for example).
In addition, it reduces the simultaneity bias that would arise if the stock market
affected individuals votes or if a third variable impacted both elements.
To be valid, our method requires that the prediction market incorporates unex-
pected relevant information in a similar way that the stock market does. Investors
and betters must have access to the same set of information, use the same implicit
model to infer the probability of victory of a candidate from political news, and
react at the same speed. Fama (1970) categorizes the efficiency of a market into
three levels: strong form, semi-strong form and weak form of efficiency depend-
ing on the set of information already embedded in current prices (respectively:
all the public and private information, all the public information, the whole his-
toric of prices). Performing runs tests of independence of “Winner-take-all” prices
variations and logarithmic random walk tests for prices, we do not find empirical
evidence to reject the assumption that we face a weakly efficient market.5
Testing if prices incorporates instantly all the public relevant information avail-
able, requires first to be able to define this arrival of new pieces of information and
then to infer from them winning probabilities i.e to be able to define how good
prices must be. Semi-strong form efficiency tests are always joint-hypothesis tests:
a first hypothesis concerning what good prices must be, the second one concerning
the similarity between good prices and observed prices. Defining the relevant set
of information and its dynamics, and inferring probabilities from it appear highly
5See section B in appendix for a presentation of these tests.
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impossible to do in our case; so testing semi-strong form of efficiency seems out
of reach. We make the assumption that the market is efficient in the semi-strong
form. As indicated above, prices well reflect the general dynamics of the campaign,
the winners of both rounds, the rise and fall of F. Bayrou, and other events that
support our assumption.
Private information concerning the electoral outcome is scarce enough not to
be analyzed at all.
4 Results
In this section, we present the main results on the effect of changes in candidates
winning probabilities on the abnormal returns of firms. The period used from
this analysis runs from January 1st to April 22nd 2007. The second date is the
first round of the 2007 French presidential election.6 All estimated effects must be
interpreted as impacts perceived by the stock market (that may wrongly consider
that a candidate is favorable to some firms) under the assumption that variations of
“Winner-take-all” prices reflect changes in the probability of a candidate’s victory.
We start by investigating the average effect of changes in the three candidates
winning probabilities on listed firms irrespective of their characteristics. Table 2
presents estimates of equation (3) without any interaction terms. In columns 1 to
3, we regress daily abnormal returns of firms on changes in winning probabilities
of the three candidates separately. In columns 4 to 6, we run the same exercise
using all combinations of changes in winning probabilities.7 According to results
presented in this table, there is no evidence of any aggregate effect of changes in
winning probabilities on firms abnormal returns.
Interaction terms are included in regressions presented in table 3. In the upper
part of the table, we investigate the effect of change in winning probabilities of
the three different candidates on firms belonging to N. Sarkozy ’s network. The
estimated expression is thus equation (3) where group c is the network of N.
6Results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar if we extend the period up to the second
round of the 2007 French presidential election.
7As changes in F. Bayrou ’s winning probability have been indirectly constructed using in-
formation from winning probabilities of N. Sarkozy and S. Royal, we do not include the three
changes of winning probabilities simultaneously.
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Sarkozy. In the middle part of table 3, the group of interest is constituted of firms
that should benefit of reforms announced by N. Sarkozy. In the bottom part of the
table, the group of interest contains firms that should benefit of reforms planned
by S. Royal. The first three columns of each part separately test the effect of
change in winning probability of a single candidate. The last three columns test
how effects change when an alternative candidate is taken into account.
Results presented in the upper and middle parts of table 3 show that changes
of N. Sarkozy winning probability are positively associated with abnormal returns
of firms listed in this candidate’s network or supposed to benefit from his planned
reforms. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate these facts. In each figure, we plot average
daily abnormal returns of firms belonging to one of the groups and the daily
changes in N. Sarkozy’s probability of victory. In both cases, series are positively
correlated. Table 3 provides also partial evidence that firms listed in the network
of N. Sarkozy have abnormal returns negatively correlated with changes in the
winning probability of S. Royal as shown by estimated coefficients presented in
columns 4 and 6. Results presented in the bottom part of the table suggest that
abnormal returns of firms that should benefit from the platform of S. Royal are not
correlated with changes in winning probability of any candidate. Taking account
of the changes in the winning probabilities of the other candidates, we find that
this effect is stronger when changes in N.Sarkozy’s chances of winning go along
with opposite changes of the same magnitude in S. Royal’s chances, suggesting
that this political alternative is real for investors.
All in all, table 3 suggests that market operators interpret the possible victory
of N. Sarkozy in the presidential election as beneficial for firms listed in his network
or which should benefit from his political program. These results may however be
due to specific characteristics of firms listed in these two groups. For example, N.
Sarkozy is maybe more connected with influential individuals belonging to partic-
ularly large firms or to firms operating in specific activities. We tackle these issues
in tables 4 and 5 where we add new interaction terms to equation (3). In table
4, the group of interest is made of firms belonging to the candidate’s network. In
table 5 the group of interest contains firms that should benefit from the platform
of N. Sarkozy. In column 1 of tables 4 and 5, we introduce interaction terms of
changes in the winning probability of N. Sarkozy and dummy variables equal to 1
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if a firm belongs to a particular industry. In column 2 of both tables, we control
for interactions with dummy variables capturing the extent of ownership by the
state. In column 3, we introduce an interaction term with a dummy variable equal
to 1 if the firm belongs to the CAC 40 which is the index of the 40 largest firms
listed on the French stock market. Finally, the last column of both tables presents
estimates from a regression where all the above described interactions are entered
simultaneously. Interestingly, none of the added interaction terms is found to be
statistically significant in tables 4 and 5. Furthermore, the estimated coefficient of
interaction terms of interest is remarkably stable accross specification. Whatever
the group of interest, it is virtually identical to the corresponding estimate pre-
sented in table 3: around 0.035 for the network and around 0.025 when the group
is defined as firms that should benefit from reforms announced by N. Sarkozy.
A natural question is whether effects found for firms belonging to the two
groups are redundant or not. As shown by figure 1, the two groups are clearly
distinct but have still some firms in common. In table 6, we present estimates of
a horse race between effects associated with membership to the two groups. The
estimated coefficients correspond to equation (3) when two different interaction
terms are entered simultaneously. In even-numbered columns, we include the set
of interaction terms capturing firms characteristics as in 4 and 5. In columns 3
and 4, we also include an interaction term for firms belonging to both groups. As
shown by estimates presented in table 6, the effect of changes in winning proba-
bility of N. Sarkozy on firms belonging to his network has still the same order of
magnitude. The same remark may be done about the interaction term for firms
that should benefit from the reforms of this candidate, although the coefficient
looses some statistical significance. Interestingly, we do not find any evidence of a
supplementary effect for the few firms belonging to both groups. All in all, both
effects seems to be fairly independent. The effect associated with membership
to the network of this candidate is however around fifty percents larger than the
other one: changes in winning probability of N. Sarkozy have a stronger influence
on abnormal returns of firms listed in his network.
The last exercise we conduct in this paper consists in a decomposition of the
network of N. Sarkozy into “close friends” and firms that belong only to his network.
The list of firms included in the first group can be found in table 8 in appendix.
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Reasons to classify firms in this group are also presented in appendix. According to
estimates presented in the first column of table 7, there is no statistically significant
effect of changes in winning probability of the candidate on abnormal returns of
firms belonging only to his network. On the contrary, the effect is stronger than
all previous estimates for firms listed in the group made of “close friends”. In
column 2, we add the large set of additional interactions with firms characteristics
already used above. Estimated coefficients are not altered by the addition of these
co-variates. These results suggest that distance to the candidate does matter in
the evaluation made by market actors of consequences from the expected victory
of N. Sarkozy on firms returns.
5 Concluding remarks
How large is the sum of money represented by excess returns induced by the raise
of N. Sarkozy during the 2007 campaign? A back of the envelope calculation allow
us to estimate that firms belonging to the network of N. Sarkozy experienced to-
gether a 11, 953 millions euros excess capitalization due to his election. The back
of the envelope calculation is following. By the end of December 2006 total stock
market capitalization of firms listed in the network of N. Sarkozy amounts 341, 530
millions euros. From January 1st 2007 to the election, the probability of victory of
this candidate went from 0.5 to 1, which represents total increase of 100 percents.
Taking the effect of changes in this candidate’s probability of victory on abnor-
mal returns of firms belonging to his network equal to 0.035 (which corresponds
approximately to the average effect estimated across the different specifications),
we obtain a total increase of 0.035 × 341, 530 = 11, 953 millions for the value of
firms.8 Under the same reasoning, the 0.035 effect can also be compared to the
return of an asset which value would increase by 3.5% over a four months period
on top of the average market evolution.
We have analyzed returns of firms listed on the French stock market induced
8Applying the same method, we would obtain a 7, 236 millions euros excess capitalization for
firms that should benefit from the platform announced by N. Sarkozy. Although not statistically
significant, results obtained using the platform of S. Royal suggest that 3, 614 millions euros is a
upper bound for the value of her program.
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by anticipated changes in the political majority during the 2007 French presiden-
tial election. We have targeted three groups of firms that should benefit from
a candidate ’s victory. Two of them are made of firms that should benefit from
reforms announced by N. Sarkozy and S. Royal. The last one is made of firms
owned or directed by friends of N. Sarkozy whose connections with businessmen
as been largely discussed by French medias. We have examined the correlation of
abnormal stocks returns of firms belonging to these groups with changes in each
candidate’s probability of victory as revealed by a political prediction market.
Firms that should benefit of S. Royal’s platform do not exhibit high abnormal
returns. On the opposite, firms that should benefit from reforms announced by N.
Sarkozy or whose top executives or main shareholders are friends of him exhibit
significantly positive abnormal returns. The effect on firms’ abnormal returns
associated with membership to his network is however around fifty percents larger
that the other one. Isolating from his network his close friends, we find that the
effect is the strongest for firms ruled or owned by his closest friends. There is
also partial evidence that firms listed in the network of N. Sarkozy have abnormal
returns negatively correlated with changes in the winning probability of S. Royal
and abnormal returns of firms that should benefit from S. Royal’s program are
not correlated with changes in her winning probability. All these results take into
account that changes in the candidates’ probability of victory may also impact
firms differently depending on their characteristics such as the industry in which
they are active, their size or whether they are partially owned by the state or not.
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Figure 1: Repartitions of firms between the different groups.
All firms
















See the text to get information about the composition of each group and table 8 for the list of firms within each
of them.
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Figure 2: Number of daily transactions on the predictive market from September
1st 2006 to May 6th 2007.
Data are from NewsFutures. The line represents the number of daily transactions on “Winner-take-all” contracts
on the victory of N. Sarkozy or S. Royal at the 2007 French presidential election.
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Figure 3: Winning probabilities of S. Royal, N. Sarkozy, and F. Bayrou at the
2007 French presidential election.
Data are from NewsFutures. Each line represents the winning probability of a different candidate. Lines of S.
Royal and N. Sarkozy correspond to the price of corresponding “Winner-take-all” contract at 9 a.m. French legal
time. The line of F. Bayrou is constructed as the Max
{
0, 100− PRoyal − PSarkozy
}
, where PCandidate is the price
of “Winner-take-all” contract on Candidate.
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Figure 4: Changes in N. Sarkozy probability of victory and abnormal returns of
firms that should benefit from his reforms, from January 1st to April 22nd 2007.
Changes in N. Sarkozy probability of victory are computed using data from NewsFutures. They represent daily
changes (in percentage) of the price of N. Sarkozy “Winner-take-all” contract. See the text for the definition of
the group of firms that should benefit from N. Sarkozy reforms and for the calculation of abnormal returns. The
line corresponds to the mean by day of firms’ abnormal returns.
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Figure 5: Changes in N. Sarkozy probability of victory and abnormal returns of
firms listed in his network, from January 1st to April 22nd 2007.
Changes in N. Sarkozy probability of victory are computed using data from NewsFutures. They represent daily
changes (in percentage) of the price of N. Sarkozy “Winner-take-all” contract. See the text for the definition of
the group of firms listed in the network of N. Sarkozy and for the calculation of abnormal returns. The line
corresponds to the mean by day of firms’ abnormal returns.
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Table 1: Returns of firms from January 1st to April 2nd 2007.
Obs Mean Std. Min Max
Network of N. Sarkozy 19 0.065 0.118 -0.097 0.399
Program of N. Sarkozy 23 0.120 0.165 -0.276 0.487
Program of S. Royal 21 0.113 0.125 -0.276 0.244
None of the above groups 72 0.077 0.119 -0.355 0.421
All firms 119 0.089 0.128 -0.355 0.487
This table presents descriptive statistics on average returns of firms belonging to different groups from January 1st 2007 to
the first round of the presidential election. Returns over the period correspond to the ratio of the difference between the
opening price on January 2d and the closing price on April 20th over the opening price on January 2nd. See the text for
definitions of the different groups.
Table 2: Effect of changes in winning probability of the different candidates on abnormal
returns of firms.
Dependent variable: daily abnormal return.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ Sarkozy 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
∆ Royal 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
∆ Bayrou -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 9,118 9,118 9,118 9,118 9,118 9,118
R-squared 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include firm fixed effects and
a constant term. OLS regressions. Each column presents estimates from a separate regression. ∆Candidate is the daily
change in percentage of winning probability of Candidate.
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Table 3: Effect of changes in winning probability of the different candidates on abnormal
returns of firms belonging to specific groups.
Dependent variable: daily abnormal return.
Group: Sarkozy (network)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆Sarkozy -0.006 -0.006 -0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
∆Royal 0.002 0.002 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
∆Bayrou 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Group × ∆Sarkozy 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.047***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
Group × ∆Royal -0.011 -0.012* -0.017**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Group × ∆Bayrou -0.001 0.001 -0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 9,118 9,118 9,118 9,118 9,118 9,118
R-squared 0.037 0.036 0.036 0.037 0.037 0.036
Group: Sarkozy (program)
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
∆Sarkozy -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
∆Royal 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
∆Bayrou 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Group × ∆Sarkozy 0.024** 0.025** 0.027**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.014)
Group × ∆Royal -0.004 -0.005 -0.009
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Group × ∆Bayrou -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 9,118 9,118 9,118 9,118 9,118 9,118
R-squared 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036
Group: Royal (program)
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
∆Sarkozy -0.000 -0.000 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
∆Royal -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
∆Bayrou 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Group × ∆Sarkozy 0.003 0.002 -0.005
(0.011) (0.011) (0.014)
Group × ∆Royal 0.011 0.011 0.009
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Group × ∆Bayrou -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 9,118 9,118 9,118 9,118 9,118 9,118
R-squared 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.036
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include firm fixed effects and
a constant term. OLS regressions. Each column presents estimates from a separate regression. ∆Candidate is the daily
change in percentage of winning probability of Candidate. Variables Group are equal to 1 for firms that belong to the
group mentioned in the first line of each part of the table. See the text for definitions of the different groups.
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Table 4: Effect of changes in winning probability of N. Sarkozy on abnormal returns of
firms belonging to his network, controlling for industries, state ownership and the size of
firms.
Dependent variable: daily abnormal return.
Group: Sarkozy (network)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Sarkozy -0.019 0.011 -0.009 -0.010
(0.014) (0.020) (0.006) (0.027)
Group × ∆Sarkozy 0.034*** 0.039*** 0.033*** 0.034***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
Gas and petroleum × ∆Sarkozy 0.019 0.019
(0.024) (0.025)
Basic materials × ∆Sarkozy -0.013 -0.013
(0.026) (0.026)
Industrials × ∆Sarkozy 0.015 0.013
(0.017) (0.018)
Consumer goods × ∆Sarkozy 0.003 0.003
(0.018) (0.018)
Health care × ∆Sarkozy 0.004 0.001
(0.024) (0.025)
Consumer services × ∆Sarkozy 0.020 0.020
(0.017) (0.017)
Telecommunications × ∆Sarkozy 0.019 -0.026
(0.041) (0.048)
Utilities × ∆Sarkozy 0.030 0.018
(0.025) (0.029)
Financials × ∆Sarkozy 0.022 0.022
(0.017) (0.018)
No state ownership × ∆Sarkozy -0.021 -0.013
(0.021) (0.024)
State ownership ∈ (0, 5) × ∆Sarkozy 0.005 0.006
(0.023) (0.025)
State ownership ∈ [5, 10) × ∆Sarkozy -0.026 -0.020
(0.027) (0.030)
State ownership ∈ [10, 25) × ∆Sarkozy -0.032 -0.030
(0.029) (0.030)
State ownership ∈ [25, 40) × ∆Sarkozy 0.013 0.026
(0.028) (0.033)
Cac 40 × ∆Sarkozy 0.010 0.010
(0.009) (0.011)
Observations 9,118 9,118 9,118 9,118
R-squared 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.038
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include firm fixed effects and
a constant term. OLS regressions. Each column presents estimates from a separate regression. ∆Candidate is the daily
change in percentage of winning probability of Candidate. Variables Group are equal to 1 for firms that belong to the
group mentioned in the first line of the table. See the text for definitions of the different groups. The reference industry is
“Technology”. The reference category for state ownership is [40, 100]. Intervals indicate the share of capital owned by the
state.
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Table 5: Effect of changes in winning probability of N. Sarkozy on abnormal returns of
firms that should benefit from his reforms, controlling for industries, state ownership and
the size of firms.
Dependent variable: daily abnormal return.
Group: Sarkozy (program)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ Sarkozy -0.018 0.013 -0.009 -0.012
(0.014) (0.020) (0.006) (0.027)
Group × ∆Sarkozy 0.021* 0.028** 0.022** 0.024**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Gas and petroleum × ∆Sarkozy 0.018 0.021
(0.024) (0.025)
Basic materials × ∆Sarkozy -0.008 -0.009
(0.026) (0.026)
Industrials × ∆Sarkozy 0.013 0.011
(0.017) (0.018)
Consumer goods × ∆Sarkozy 0.004 0.005
(0.018) (0.018)
Health care × ∆Sarkozy -0.005 -0.013
(0.024) (0.025)
Consumer services × ∆Sarkozy 0.024 0.024
(0.017) (0.017)
Telecommunications × ∆Sarkozy 0.018 -0.032
(0.041) (0.048)
Utilities × ∆Sarkozy 0.038 0.026
(0.025) (0.029)
Financials × ∆Sarkozy 0.018 0.018
(0.018) (0.018)
No state ownership × ∆Sarkozy -0.021 -0.010
(0.021) (0.023)
State ownership ∈ (0, 5) × ∆Sarkozy 0.002 0.001
(0.024) (0.025)
State ownership ∈ [5, 10) × ∆Sarkozy -0.034 -0.024
(0.027) (0.030)
State ownership ∈ [10, 25) × ∆Sarkozy -0.034 -0.033
(0.029) (0.030)
State ownership ∈ [25, 40) × ∆Sarkozy 0.011 0.029
(0.028) (0.032)
Cac 40 × ∆Sarkozy 0.014 0.016
(0.009) (0.010)
Observations 9,118 9,118 9,118 9,118
R-squared 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.038
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include firm fixed effects and
a constant term. OLS regressions. Each column presents estimates from a separate regression. ∆Candidate is the daily
change in percentage of winning probability of Candidate. Variables Group are equal to 1 for firms that belong to the
group mentioned in the first line of the table. See the text for definitions of the different groups. The reference industry is
“Technology”. The reference category for state ownership is [40, 100]. Intervals indicate the share of capital owned by the
state.
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Table 6: Effect of changes in winning probability of N. Sarkozy on abnormal returns of
firms that should benefit from his reforms and firms belonging to his network.
Dependent variable: daily abnormal return.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Sarkozy -0.009* -0.010 -0.010* -0.013
(0.005) (0.027) (0.005) (0.027)
Network × ∆Sarkozy 0.034*** 0.032** 0.037*** 0.035**
(0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Program × ∆Sarkozy 0.020* 0.021* 0.023* 0.024*
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Network × Program × ∆Sarkozy -0.011 -0.014
(0.025) (0.025)
Industry fixed effects × ∆Sarkozy Yes Yes
State ownership × ∆Sarkozy Yes Yes
Cac 40 × ∆Sarkozy Yes Yes
Observations 9,118 9,118 9,118 9,118
R-squared 0.037 0.038 0.037 0.038
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include firm fixed effects and
a constant term. OLS regressions. Each column presents estimates from a separate regression. ∆Candidate is the daily
change in percentage of winning probability of Candidate. Variables Group are equal to 1 for firms that belong to the
group mentioned. See the text for definitions of the different groups.
Table 7: Effect of changes in winning probability of N. Sarkozy on abnormal returns of
firms belonging to his network, decomposed in different groups.




Close friends × ∆Sarkozy 0.045*** 0.048***
(0.013) (0.015)
Only network × ∆Sarkozy 0.021 0.008
(0.018) (0.019)
Industry fixed effects × ∆Sarkozy Yes
State ownership × ∆Sarkozy Yes
Cac 40 × ∆Sarkozy Yes
Observations 9,118 9,118
R-squared 0.037 0.038
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include firm fixed effects and
a constant term. OLS regressions. Each column presents estimates from a separate regression. ∆Candidate is the daily
change in percentage of winning probability of Candidate. Variables Group are equal to 1 for firms that belong to the
group mentioned. See the text for definitions of the different groups.
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Appendices
A Groups of firms
A.1 Firms that should benefit of reforms announced by S.
Royal and N. Sarkozy
Both groups have been constructed by analysts from “La Société Générale”.9
The first regroups firms that could be favored by reforms announced by S.
Royal. It is made of the following firms: Alstom, Carrefour, Derichebourg, CNP
Assurance, Delachaux, Dexia, EDF Energies Nouvelles, EDF, Géophysique, Haulotte
Group, Iliad, Kaufman and Broad, Lafarge, Legrand, Michelin, Nexity, Peugeot,
Publicis Group, Rhodia, Saint-Gobain, Schneider, Seloger.com, Suez, Théolia,
Véolia environ., and Vinci. Firms of this group that belong to SBF 120 are listed
under the heading “Program of S. Royal” in table 8.
The second regroups firms that could be favored by reforms announced by N.
Sarkozy and is composed as follows: Accor, Alstom, Alten, April Group, Assystem,
AXA, Bouygues, Derichebourg, Crédit Agricole, Delachaux, Dexia, EDF Energies
Nouvelles, Eiffage, Essilor, Icade, Kaufman and Broad, Legrand, Metropole TV,
Nexity, Peugeot, Saint-Gobain, Sodexo, Teleperformance, TF1, Théolia, Véolia
environ., Vinci. Firms of this group that belong to SBF 120 are listed under the
heading “Program of N. Sarkozy” in table 8.
A.2 N. Sarkozy’s network
To select firms belonging to the network of N. Sarkozy, we used information pro-
vided by Chemin and Perrignon (2007) and Dély and Hassoux (2008). We asso-
ciate firms to people who direct the firm or own it. To assess ownership, we check
whether an individual holds over 5% of shares or of voting rights. We take into
account indirect participation.
On May 6th 2007 evening, the night that immediately followed his election, N.
Sarkozy invited at the Fouquet’s, a famous high-class restaurant in Paris, a group
9See La Société Générale (2007).
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of people considered as his friends to celebrate his victory. Among them, several
businessmen names appear. The following businessmen were at the Fouquet’s:
B. Arnault (CEO and shareholder of LVMH), N. Bazire (Company Secretary of
LVMH), A. Bernheim (CEO of Generali), V. Bolloré (President and shareholder
of Havas and CEO and shareholder of Bolloré Group), M. Bouygues (CEO of
Bouygues, shareholder of Bouygues, TF1 and Alstom), S. Dassault (CEO and
shareholder of Dassault), J.-C. Decaux (CEO and shareholder of JC Decaux), P.
Desmarais (CEO of Power Corporation, shareholder of Lafargue and Imerys via
Groupe Bruxelles Lambert), D. Desseigne (CEO of groupe Barrière), P. Giacometti
(Director of Ipsos France), P. Kron (CEO of Alstom), H. Proglio (CEO of Véo-
lia Environ.). The network of N.Sarkozy includes other people not present that
night, like H. De Castries (CEO of AXA), P. Kron (CEO of Alstom), H. Proglio
(CEO of Veolia Environ.), A. Frères (shareholder of Lafargue, and Imerys via
Groupe Bruxelles Lambert), A. Lagardère (chairman of the board and shareholder
of EADS, General and managing partner and shareholder of Lagardère), A. Lau-
vergeon (CEO of Areva), M. Pébereau (CEO of BNP Paribas), G. Pélisson (CEO
of Accor), F. Pinault (CEO and shareholder of PPR, shareholder of Bouygues), F.
Riboud (CEO of Danone). Firms connected to these businessmen are listed under
the heading “Network of N. Sarkozy” in table 8.
Some of them are very close friends of N. Sarkozy: B. Arnault was one of N.
Sarkozy’s witnesses at his wedding with C. Attias; V. Bolloré is a close friend to
N. Sarkozy who spent on V. Bolloré’s yacht some days just after being elected;
M. Bouygues was also one of N. Sarkozy’s witnesses at the same wedding and the
father in law of the last son of N. Sarkozy; S. Dassault does not make secret of his
support and friendship for N. Sarkozy and is a member of the French parliament
under the banner of N. Sarkozy’s party; P. Desmarais gave advice to N.Sarkozy for
accessing the power when he went to Sagard in 1995; J.-C. Decaux and N. Sarkozy
share the passion of cycling, and were used to practice together; A. Lagardère
went to N.Sarkozy’s political meetings to publicly support his “friend” (by his own
words); F.Pinault is often presented as a good friend of N.Sarkozy and his ex-
wife C.Attias. Firms connected to these businessmen are listed under the heading
“Close friends of N. Sarkozy” in table 8.
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B Tests on NewsFutures data
B.1 The runs test
The runs test – also known as Wald-Wolfowitz test – is a non-parametric statis-
tical test that checks the mutual independence of a sequence of elements (null
hypothesis).
A “run” of a sequence is a maximal (non-empty) segment of the sequence com-
posed by equal elements. For instance, the sequence [−++++−−] contains three
runs: [−], [+ + ++], and [−−]. Noting N the number of observations, NA (resp.
Nb) the number of positive (negative) elements of Xt, for N large (> 20), R the









N2(N − 1) =
(E(R)− 1)(E(R)− 2)
N − 1 . (5)
If there are many runs in excess or in shortage, we may reject the hypothesis
of statistical independence. A small (large) number of runs indicates positive
(negative) serial correlation. Writing Z = R−E(R)
σ(R)
, thus we must reject the null
hypothesis of statistical randomness if |Z| > 1.96. In table 9, we consider the
sign of Xt = ∆Candidate − Φ, where Φ is either the mean or the median of the
series, and ∆Candidate is the daily change in percentage of the price of the relevant
“Winner-take-all” contract. For both series (∆Sarkozy and ∆Royal), no evidence
indicates that we must reject the hypothesis of serial independence of variations
of prices.
B.2 Unit-root tests
Weak efficiency test are generally associated with random walk tests. If “Winner-
take-all” contracts price time series follow a logarithmic random walk, then the
returns follow a white noise process.
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The logarithmic random walk of a price P can be written as:
ln(Pt) = ln(Pt−1) + εt, (6)
where, εt is a white noise. Return at time t can be written as Pt−Pt−1Pt−1 , and approx-
imated by ln( Pt
Pt−1
).
Results of Dickey-Fuller augmented tests presented in table 10 do not incite
us to reject that ln(Pt) has a unit root and so that prices of “Winner-take-all’
contracts follow a logarithmic random walk.
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Table 8: List of firms included in the sample.
Close friends Network Program Program State
Industry of N. Sarkozy of N. Sarkozy of N. Sarkozy of S. Royal Cac 40 ownership
ACCOR Consumer services Yes Yes Yes [5, 10)
ADP Industrials [40, 100]
AGF-ASS.GEN.FRANCE Financials Yes
AIR FRANCE -KLM Consumer services [10, 25)
AIR LIQUIDE Basic materials Yes
ALCATEL-LUCENT Technology Yes (0, 5)





AREVA CI Utilities Yes [40, 100]
ARKEMA Basic materials
ASSYSTEM Industrials Yes [10, 25)
ATOS Technology




BNP PARIBAS ACT.A Financials Yes Yes
BONDUELLE Consumer goods
BOURBON Oil and gas
BOUYGUES Industrials Yes Yes Yes Yes
BUSINESS OBJECTS Technology
CAP GEMINI Technology Yes
CARREFOUR Consumer services Yes Yes
CASINO GUICHARD Consumer services
CIMENTS FRANCAIS Industrials
CLARINS Industrials
CLUB MEDITERRANEE Consumer services
CNP ASSURANCES Financials Yes [40, 100]
CREDIT AGRICOLE Financials Yes Yes
DANONE Consumer goods Yes Yes (0, 5)
DASSAULT SYSTEMES Technology Yes Yes
DERICHEBOURG Industrials Yes Yes
DEXIA Financials Yes Yes Yes [10, 25)
EADS Industrials Yes Yes Yes [10, 25)
EDF Utilities Yes Yes [40, 100]
EIFFAGE Industrials Yes [5, 10)




EUTELSAT COMMUNIC. Consumer services [25, 40)
FAURECIA Consumer goods
FIMALAC Financials
FRANCE TELECOM Telecommunications Yes [25, 40)
GAZ DE FRANCE Utilities Yes [40, 100]
GECINA NOM. Financials
GEMALTO Industrials
GENERALE DE SANTE Health care
GEOPHYSIQUE(GLE) Oil and gas Yes [5, 10)
GROUPE STERIA Technology
GUYENNE GASCOGNE Consumer services
HAULOTTE GROUP Industrials Yes
HAVAS Consumer services Yes Yes
HERMES INTL Consumer goods
ICADE Financials Yes [40, 100]
ILIAD Technology Yes
IMERYS Basic materials Yes Yes
INGENICO Industrials
IPSOS Consumer services Yes
JC DECAUX SA. Consumer services Yes Yes
KLEPIERRE Financials
L’OREAL Consumer goods Yes
LAFARGE Industrials Yes Yes Yes Yes
LAGARDERE S.C.A. Consumer services Yes Yes Yes
LEGRAND Industrials Yes Yes
LVMH Consumer goods Yes Yes Yes
MAUREL ET PROM Oil and gas
MERSEN Industrials
METROPOLE TV Consumer services Yes
MICHELIN Consumer goods Yes Yes




NEXITY Financials Yes Yes [5, 10)
NRJ GROUP Consumer services
OBERTHUR CARD SYS. Industrials
PAGESJAUNES Consumer services
PERNOD RICARD Consumer goods Yes (0, 5)
PEUGEOT Consumer goods Yes Yes Yes
PIERRE VACANCES Consumer services
PPR Consumer services Yes Yes Yes
PUBLICIS GROUPE SA Consumer services Yes
REMY COINTREAU Consumer goods
RENAULT Consumer goods Yes [10, 25)
RHODIA Basic materials Yes
RODRIGUEZ GROUP Consumer goods
S.E.B. Consumer goods
SAFRAN Industrials [25, 40)
SAINT GOBAIN Industrials Yes Yes Yes (0, 5)
SANOFI Health care Yes
SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC Industrials Yes Yes (0, 5)
Continued on next page
32
Table 8: (continued)
Close friends Network Program Program State
Industry of N. Sarkozy of N. Sarkozy of N. Sarkozy of S. Royal Cac 40 ownership
SCOR SE Financials
SES Consumer services [5, 10)
SOCIETE GENERALE Financials Yes (0, 5)
SODEXO Consumer services Yes (0, 5)
SOITEC Technology
SPIR COMMUNICATION Consumer services
STMICROELECTRONICS Technology Yes
SUEZ Utilities Yes Yes (0, 5)
TECHNICOLOR Consumer services Yes
TECHNIP Oil and gas (0, 5)
TELEPERFORMANCE Consumer services Yes
TF1 Consumer services Yes Yes Yes
THALES Industrials [25, 40)
TOTAL Oil and gas Yes
TRIGANO Consumer goods
UBISOFT ENTERTAIN Consumer goods [5, 10)
UNIBAIL-RODAMCO Financials
VALEO Consumer goods [5, 10)
VALLOUREC Industrials Yes
VEOLIA ENVIRON. Utilities Yes Yes Yes Yes [10, 25)
VINCI Industrials Yes Yes Yes
VIVENDI Consumer services Yes (0, 5)
WENDEL Financials
ZODIAC AEROSPACE Industrials [5, 10)
This table presents the list of the 119 firms used in this paper. These firms were included in the French stock market index
SBF 120 between September 1st 2006 and May 6th 2007. EUROTUNNEL is missing because its quotation was stopped
during part of this period. Industries follow Euronext’s classification. Blanks indicate firms which do not belong to the
different groups or who are not at all owned by the state. See the text for information about the construction of the
different groups.
Table 9: Tests of random order for changes in N. Sarkozy and S. Royal winning proba-
bilities.
Variable Threshold Number of runs Z-statistic P-value of Z-statistic
∆Sarkozy Median 71 1.37 0.17
∆Sarkozy Mean 71 1.37 0.17
∆Royal Median 50 -1.41 0.16
∆Royal Mean 50 -1.41 0.16
Each line of the table the result of a distinct test of random order. Observations are daily percentage changes from January
1th to May 6th 2007. There is 126 observations per variable.
Table 10: Unit-root tests of N. Sarkozy and S. Royal winning probabilities.
Candidate Price Z-statistic MacKinnon p-value of Z-statistic
Sarkozy Opening 0.363 0.9801
Sarkozy Closing 0.181 0.9712
Royal Opening 1.996 0.9987
Royal Closing 4.315 1.0000
Each line presents the result of a distinct augmented Dickey-Fuller unit-root test. Observations are the log of opening or
closing daily prices from January 1th to May 6th 2007. There is 126 observations per test.
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